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Abstract
Experimental Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols have to
consist of not only the unconditionally secure quantum transmission, but
also a subsequent classical exchange that enables key reconciliation and
error correction. There is a large body of work examining quantum at-
tacks on the quantum channel, but here we begin to examine classical
attacks to both the classical communication and the exchange as a whole.
Linking together separate secure protocols can unexpectedly leak infor-
mation to an eavesdropper, even if the components are unconditionally
secure in isolation. Here we focus specifically on the join between quantum
and classical protocols, finding that in just this crossing of the quantum-
classical boundary, some security is always and unintuitively lost. This
occurs with no communication between the separate parties. While this
particular example applies to only Continuous Variable Quantum Key
Distribution (CVQKD), it highlights the need to re-examine the way all
individual protocols are actually used.
1 Introduction
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [1] has the potential to create completely
secret communications, and has therefore predictably been received with in-
terest by industrial and security sectors [2][3]. It is now a mature technology,
with commercial QKD systems already available, meaning that evaluating the
practical security of real QKD systems has become essential.
While it has been proved that a quantum transmission can be uncondition-
ally secure [1], in figure 1 we can see that in a real system the quantum trans-
mission only makes up a small part of the whole QKD protocol. The quantum
part is invariably followed by classical communications steps, usually at least
one of key reconciliation, privacy amplification or error correction.
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Figure 1: a) The different stages of a QKD protocol. The dashed line sepa-
rates the quantum transmission from the subsequent classical stages, or blocks
(C1, C2) such as reconciliation, privacy amplification or error correction. The
dots indicate the possibility of subsequent classical blocks between the ones de-
picted and the final key, dependant on the particular protocol used. b) This is an
example showing the classical bocks typically used during a CVQKD protocol,
after the continuous variable quantum transmission.
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In protocols such as BB84, and in all implementations of CVQKD, the clas-
sical component is an essential part of the protocol. In others, it at least has
to exist as a form of practical error correction to eliminate experimental errors.
It is currently not, and may never be, possible to prevent these experimental
errors, implying that currently, if not permanently, a classical communication
step is unavoidable.
Proofs of quantum security do not take into account side channel attacks
on either the quantum or the classical channel. There has been a lot of work
looking at side channel attacks on the quantum transition [4-8]. This work has
naturally led to the development of device independent protocols [9-11] which
eliminate the risk of side channel attacks to the quantum channel.
Unfortunately while these device independent protocols protect the quantum
transition, the classical channel still remains vulnerable to side channel attacks.
Incautious use of the classical component can either reduce the overall security
or inadvertently leak information to an eavesdropper. Proofs of quantum se-
curity, including device independent protocols, do not consider implementation
weaknesses in the classical parts of QKD protocols, leaving even the best quan-
tum protocol open to classical side channel attacks. It is essential to be aware
of these potential weaknesses.
In CVQKD, the quantum exchange must be followed by at least two differ-
ent classical protocols, key reconciliation and privacy amplification. Figure 2
presents a typical sequence for arriving at a key during CVQKD. While these
separate protocol ‘blocks’ can each be proven to be individually secure, very
little thought is given to the security of a combination of multiple blocks run in
sequence. The problem with chaining together multiple blocks is that informa-
tion obtained by an eavesdropper (Eve) from each block could be cascaded to
reveal more information about the key.
For the sequence in figure 2, which follows the quantum exchange, the two
legitimate users (Alice and Bob) each have some information about the quantum
transmission. The information known by Alice is denoted X and, that by Bob, Y.
It is also possible that Eve will have gained some knowledge of the transmission,
and this is denoted Z. In information theory, information overlap and secrecy are
measured using the mutual information, I(X;Y ), and conditional information,
I(X;Y |Z), respectively [12]. These are defined to be:
I(X;Y ) =
∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈X
p(x, y) log2
(
p(x, y)
p(x)p(y)
)
(1)
I(X;Y |Z) =
∑
z∈Z
∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈X
p(x, y, z) log2
(
p(z)p(x, y, z)
p(x, z)p(y, z)
)
(2)
Where p(x) and p(y) are the marginal probability distribution functions of
X and Y respectively, and p(x, y) is the joint probability distribution function
of X and Y . For a secure channel, after the quantum exchange, the following
are in general true:
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Figure 2: An overview of the classical protocols commonly used in CVQKD.
After the quantum communication, all three parties know some information
about the transmission. Alice’s information is denoted X, Bob’s Y and Eve’s
Z. At this stage, I(X;Y |Z) > 0, I(X;Y ) > 0, and I(X;Z) > 0. During
the reconciliation stage, R, over a set of messages, M , the information known
by each party is condensed. If V ∈ {X,Y, Z}, then V ′ = RK(M,V ) to form
a new set of key elements, X ′,Y ′,Z ′. The aim is for I(X ′;Y ′) > I(X;Y ),
and for this |V ′| < |V |. This means there is some information T ′V , where
T ′V = RT (M,V ), which is left over. Alice and Bob bin this information, but
Eve will keep T ′Z , as it can be used later to discover more about the system.
After privacy amplification, P , defined by a set of messages, A, Alice and Bob
have managed to agree a key, K. Where K = P (A,X ′) = P (A, Y ′). Eve is
left with Z ′′ = P (A,Z ′) where I(K,Z ′′) < 1. This is the condition for secrecy.
Unfortunately, Eve has much more information available to her than just Z ′′.
During every stage of the protocol, she gains some information about the system.
If instead of throwing this information away, as Alice and Bob do, she keeps it,
then she can construct a function to use this and any information she gained
during the quantum transmission to cascade back through the different blocks
and gain more information about the key. The protocol is in fact only secure if
I(K; f(Z,Z ′′,M,Z ′)) < 1.
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I(X;Y |Z) > 0 (3)
I(X;Y ) > 0 (4)
I(X;Z) > 0 (5)
During the reconciliation step, R, defined by a set of messages ‘M ’, the
information known by Alice is reconciled with that known by Bob to produce
new key elements, X ′ and Y ′, by X ′ = RK(M,X) and similarly for Y . However,
as |X ′| < |X| and |Y ′| < |Y |, there is some information, T ′X and T ′Y , which is
thrown away. At this point, I(X ′;Y ′) > I(X;Y ). The eavesdropper can follow
exactly the same process, arriving at Z ′ = RK(M,Z). However, unlike Alice
and Bob, it would be foolish for her to throw away her excess information, T ′Z ,
as this can be used later to give her more information about the system.
After the subsequent step, privacy amplification, P , defined by a set of mes-
sages ‘A’, Alice and Bob are each left with a key, K, where K = P (A,X ′) =
P (A, Y ′). Eve should emerge from the privacy amplification with Z ′′ = P (A,Z ′)
where I(K;Z ′′) < 1. This ensures secrecy. Unfortunately, there is more infor-
mation available to Eve than just Z ′′. She can compile a function which allows
her to extract any excess information revealed by the classical exchange above
any information she received quantumly. Although there may be isolated cir-
cumstances where Eve receives precisely zero excess information, in general the
system is secure if and only if the following holds:
I(K; f(Z ′′, A, Z ′, T ′Z ,M,Z)) < 1 (6)
Where f is the function compiled by Eve to maximise her knowledge of K.
However note that f may be either unknown or may change from exchange to
exchange, nevertheless its existence must be taken into account.
In this paper, we demonstrate that this landscape is more complex than is
at first apparent, by showing that simply the transition from a message received
quantumly to information processed classically in general lowers the secrecy of
CVQKD. This happens even before any classical communication occurs and is
the result of local transformations of the data.
This paper concerns itself solely with this data digitisation step and the
importance of this new type of side channel attack, not the subsequent rec-
onciliation. No attempt is made to propose one reconciliation protocol over
another.
While this weakness in particular only applies to CVQKD, it highlights the
need to consider the classical protocol elements as carefully as the quantum.
This case demonstrates a counter intuitive violation of the basic assumption
that unbroadcast local operations do not affect the security of the protocol.
This violation suggests that other non-quantum protocol components, and the
transitions between them, need to be reassessed.
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2 Channel Simulation
In CVQKD a continuous distribution of numbers is transferred through a quan-
tum channel. It is then transformed into a binary string to form the basis of
a secret key. CVQKD was proposed [13] with the idea of increasing the key
rate from that of QKD, whilst also increasing the ease of implementation, and
reducing the need for single photon sources and detectors.
In general, in CVQKD [1,13-19] the sender (Alice) applies separate, random
Gaussian distributed modulations to the phase and amplitude quadratures of
a laser. The receiver (Bob) then measures either (or both [14]) quadratures,
obtaining a Gaussian distribution of random numbers. Noise introduced into
the system through any of a number of sources such as shot noise, channel
noise, detector noise or an eavesdropper, will mean that each of the points Bob
measures will have a probability of some error, with respect to that originally
sent by Alice. In the case of Gaussian additive noise, from Bob’s perspective,
the value sent by Alice has a Gaussian probability distribution centred on the
value received by Bob. At the end of the process, Alice and Bob are left with
non-identical distributions of continuous random numbers.
In order for Bob and Alice to reconcile a key, each of their continuous dis-
tributions of numbers have to be converted into a binary string. There are a
number of different ways in which this can be done. Here, in a bid to aid trans-
parency only one method, called slicing, is examined. Slicing has been succeeded
by protocols which allow communication across longer distances, and are more
optimal to use in practice, such as the one described by Leverrier et al. in [20].
This conversion is the first and simplest thing that happens to the data when
it exits the quantum channel, and even this has a security risk associated with
it. There are a number of different methods of slicing, with different levels of
security, ease of implementation and key production rates.
The simplest method of slicing is to take values which fall in the positive side
of the Gaussian mean as binary ‘1’, and negative values as binary ‘0’. It can
be easily argued that very few of the errors in transmission will be converted
to errors in the bit string. Only those points with an error margin that crosses
between the positive and negative sides of the quadrature can create errors in
the final bit string. This enables production of one bit per transmitted point,
and the errors that do get transferred are later removed using standard classical
error correction protocols.
Slicing is purely a local output, however even this has a security risk asso-
ciated with it. There are two methods of slicing which show the extremes of
these security implications. In the first, every bit of data is encoded as a ‘0’.
This has no security, and no ability to communicate. In the second, each bit
of data is encoded randomly as either ‘0’ or ‘1’. This is completely secure, but
again, communication is impossible. A realistic slicing method has to find some
middle ground between these two cases, where communication is possible, and
the security is maximised.
It is possible to obtain a higher information transfer, with the same trans-
mission rate, by dividing (or ‘slicing’) the Gaussian distribution of numbers into
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a larger number of sections, referred to as ‘bins’. A change of slicing with two
bins (producing one string bit), to slicing with four bins (allowing two string
bits for each transmitted point), effectively doubles the data rate. This method
does however also increase the number of transmission errors transferred into bit
string errors, subsequently referred to as ‘transferred errors’, due to the higher
number of boundaries between bins.
In a worst case scenario, an eavesdropper (Eve) will have managed to gain
significant information about the quantum transmission. She will have mea-
sured a Gaussian distribution of random numbers, different from those of both
Bob and Alice. As Alice and Bob can only discuss which slicing method they
are going to use over classical channels, to which Eve can listen, Eve will know
which method they are using, and can apply it to her own data in an attempt
to keep her key as similar as possible to that of Alice and Bob. As slicing trans-
fers transmission errors into bit string errors and the different slicing methods
transfer different numbers of errors, the slicing method best to use should be
chosen on an analysis of the number of transmission errors between Alice and
Bob, and also between Eve and the legitimate users.
In order to analyse the slicing methods, a computer was used to simulate
a quantum channel, based on that by Grosshans et al. in [15]. During the
simulation, Alice was given a Gaussian distribution of random numbers. Bob
and Eve were also given this distribution, but with the addition of some Gaussian
noise. The channel transmission was varied so that at high transmissions Bob
received few errors, and Eve many; and the reverse at low transmissions. This
simulates the transmissions through a real channel and allows us to examine
how the channel transmission affects the secrecy. Figure 3 shows the channel
and data comparisons for Alice, Bob and Eve. The random number generator
was seeded so that each different slicing method always used the same values.
We analysed a range of possible slicing methods which demonstrated our
key points. Two properties of the used slicing methods were varied: firstly the
size and positioning of the bins, and secondly, the way in which the bins are
numbered. A third method, not used here but mentioned for completeness, is
the numerical optimisation of the bin positions to give the maximum mutual
information between Alice and Bob [16]. This method is frequently used by
Grosshans et al, who alternate each degree of severity of slicing with an error
correction protocol [17]. As noted above, increasing the mutual information
between Alice and Bob does not always increase the secrecy, in fact we show
here that sometimes the opposite applies.
Two methods of bin positioning were used during slicing of the Gaussian
distribution. In the first, the bins were placed at uniform distances along the
x-axis, so that a set range of measured values fell into each bin. In the second
method, the bins were chosen so that there were an equal number of transmitted
points in each bin. These are demonstrated in figure 4.
Placing the bins so that they are equal in probability would lead to a higher
number of transferred errors than using bins with an equal width. This is due to
the bunching of bin boundaries around the centre of the histogram; the centre
of the histogram contains more points, and thus more errors, so this placing of
7
Figure 3: A simple experimental realisation of the simulation could look similar
to that in a). Modulation is applied to a laser beam using an Electro-Optic
Modulator (EOM), which is then passed to the detectors of Alice, Bob and Eve.
The signal to noise ratio of each detector is controlled by the combination of half
wave plates
(
λ
2
)
and Polarising Beam Splitters (PBS). Data from simulation at
95% channel transmission is shown in b) and c). Bob’s data is very close to
that of Alice, while Eve’s has considerable noise.
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bin boundaries will lead to a greater number of transferred errors.
Three methods of bin numbering were used. The first of these was a stan-
dard binary code, as this is the simplest and most common method of digital
numbering. It is an instinctive choice.
For the second method, a Gray code was chosen as this only has a single
(and therefore the minimum) bit difference between adjacent bins. Standard
binary on the other hand, frequently has differences of several bits between
bins, meaning that an error in transmission which places a point in the bin
neighbouring that from its original position will cause more than one bit error
in the final string.
For comparison, a third method was arbitrarily chosen from one of a num-
ber of different methods which give significantly more numbers of differing bits
between adjacent bins than either binary or Gray, causing the maximum dis-
ruption to the acquired string. The method chosen for this case was a Fibonacci
Linear Feedback Shift Register (F-LFSR), which works as follows. The first bin
is labelled with an appropriate number of ‘0’s’ followed by a ‘1’ such as ‘0001’.
For each subsequent bin, an XOR operation is performed between the final two
bits, and the resultant bit becomes the first bit of the new label. The other
digits are all shifted right by one place, with the one on the far right end being
discarded. For example, ‘0001’ becomes ‘1000’ then ‘0100’ and ‘0010’ etc.
For simplicity, in this paper, we limit the eavesdropper to using the same
numbering scheme as the legitimate parties. In practice, it may be possible for
Eve to gain more information than in this case, increasing her own closeness to
the legitimate users.
After the data had been sliced, the mutual information between Alice and
Bob (IAB), Alice and Eve (IAE) and Bob and Eve (IBE) was calculated, and
used to determine ∆I, where ∆I = IAB −max{IAE , IBE} [12]. This is a com-
monly used measure of security, with key production thought to be impossible
if ∆I is non-positive.
The results of this model are presented in figures 5-8. Each of the six different
trialled slicing methods were studied, using 24, 25 and 26 bins in each case.
Figure 5 shows a comparison of IAB and max{IAE , IBE} against the channel
capacity for four different slicing methods. For simplicity, only the numbering
methods with the highest (F-LFSR) and lowest (Gray code) numbers of trans-
ferred errors are shown, each with both of the different bin positioning methods,
and each using 24 bins (4 bits to describe each bin).
It can easily be shown that above a channel transmission of 0.5, the infor-
mation shared between Alice and Bob is higher than the information shared
between the eavesdropper and either of the legitimate users. However, below
a channel transmission of 0.5, the reverse is true, implying that secrecy is lost,
and no key can be made. While it can be possible to reconcile key for chan-
nel transmission below 0.5, this is only done using a method known as reverse
reconciliation [21] which is examined further on in this paper. For this section,
only standard direct reconciliation is used.
Figure 6 a) shows ∆I against channel transmission for the four most secure
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Figure 4: The Gaussian distribution of transmitted or received values, as seen
by one of Alice, Bob or Eve. The bin edges using a) equal width, and b) equal
probability for the same curve are marked with dashed lines.
Figure 5: (colour online) IAB and max{IAE , IBE} against channel transmission
for four different slicing methods, each using 24 bins. Method 1 represents an
F-LFSR code using bins of equal probability, method 2 is F-LFSR with bins of
equal width, method 3 a Gray code with bins of equal width and method 4 is a
Gray code with bins of equal probability. Max{IAE , IBE} is greater than IAB
at channel transmissions below about 0.5, meaning that in this region, under
these conditions, key cannot be produced.
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slicing methods trialled (those with the highest ∆I). It can be seen that as
expected, these four methods have all been sliced with the lowest number of
bins, however the numbering system and the position of the bins are not con-
stant throughout these four, with the optimal choice changing with the channel
transmission. The optimal slicing method at each channel transmission is shown
in figure 6 b), with the slicing methods arbitrarily ordered with those towards
the top having the highest IAB , and thus the lowest number of errors transferred.
It can also be seen that at higher transmissions, the codes with fewer trans-
ferred errors are preferable in general as Alice and Bob do not want to introduce
errors between themselves. However at lower channel transmissions, the codes
which transfer more errors are favoured, due to Alice and Bob purposefully in-
troducing errors to try and distance themselves from Eve. There is a slight rise
in figure 6b) between about 55% and 60% channel transmission. In this region,
where IAE is very close to but less than IAB , it appears to be advantageous for
Alice and Bob to switch to a slicing method with fewer transferred errors to try
and increase their information advantage over Eve.
In reverse reconciliation [21], during the classical advantage distillation and
error correction protocols, Alice changes her data to match that which Bob has
received. Usually, direct reconciliation takes place (Bob changing his data to
match what Alice sent), but it has been shown [15] that using reverse recon-
ciliation can enable a secret key to be produced even at less than 50% channel
transmission.
The condition for key distillation in direct reconciliation is IAB > IAE ,
whereas in reverse reconciliation, it is IAB > IBE . As can be seen in figure
8, IAB > IBE for all channel transmissions, so key can always be produced. If
∆IRR is taken to be IAB−IBE , then figure 8 is produced. Figure 8 a) shows the
same trends as when using direct reconciliation and with the same three best
slicing methods, but shows ∆I to be positive for all channel transmissions as
expected [15]. Figure 8 b) also shows the same trend as the direct reconciliation
graphs above 50% transmission, but the opposite trend below that. This is
because at low channel transmissions, using reverse reconciliation means that
while Alice and Bob share very little information, Eve and Bob also share very
little information, as is shown in figure 7. A low error transfer rate will help
Alice and Bob, but not necessarily Eve.
3 Discussion and Conclusions
Practical QKD systems consist of several different individual protocols, a quan-
tum transmission, followed by at least one classical protocol. The incautious
stacking of several of these protocols together can lead to an unexpected low-
ering of security. In particular, local transformations of data from quantumly
received states to classically computable ones during slicing, can unintuitively
lose significant amounts of secrecy.
We have shown in figures 6 and 8 that for slicing, the method for which the
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Figure 6: (colour online) a) The secrecy of different slicing methods as a function
of channel capacity, and b) the optimal slicing method for each channel capacity.
The slicing methods in b) are arbitrarily ordered with those having the highest
IAB , and fewer transferred errors towards the top. Method A uses a Gray
code and bins of equal probability, B uses standard binary with bins of equal
probability, C is a F-LFSR with bins of equal probability and D is a Gray code
with bins of equal width. Generally Alice and Bob favour a method with higher
numbers of transferred errors at lower channel transmissions.
Figure 7: (colour online) IAB and IBE against channel transmission for four
different slicing methods, each using 24 bins. For each slicing method, IBE is
consistently below IAB . As in fig5, method 1 is an F-LFSR with bins of equal
probability, method 2 shows an F-LFSR with bins of equal width, method 3 a
Gray code with bin of equal probability, method 4 a Grey code with bins of
equal width.
12
least secrecy is lost when crossing the quantum classical boundary changes un-
predictably with the channel transmission. While general trends are followed,
it is impossible to forecast which slicing method is optimal at which values of
channel transmission without running prior simulations. Additionally, here only
a very few different slicing methods have been trialled, whereas in reality there
will be a multitude of different methods which would all need to be examined
if the best method for each channel transmission is to be found.
In general however, for both direct and reverse reconciliation, the smaller the
number of bins, the greater the security, and for higher channel transmissions,
slicing methods with fewer transferred errors are more optimal.
Both the fact that the best slicing method to choose changes with the channel
transmission, and the unpredictability of this have inconvenient consequences
for the design of real world CVQKD applications.
For example, during free space transmissions through the atmosphere (for
instance during satellite communications) the channel transmission of the link
can vary significantly due to changes in the ionosphere, which can be affected
by everything from time of day to solar activity [22]. These large and frequently
unpredictable changes in channel transmission make the choice of slicing method
unclear.
Another example would be in a QKD network, an example of which is shown
in figure 9. Here the base station sends out data to separate terminals, all of
which are at different distances, and thus are likely to have different channel
transmissions. Decisions would then have to be made as to whether all the
lines used the same slicing method, or if they should be chosen separately. If
they were all the same, the choice of method becomes critical, and if they were
different, difficulties in implementation would arise.
An important further study would be to not limit Eve to using the same slicing
method as Alice and Bob, but letting her choose in each circumstance what is
best for her.
Other factors such as the key rate also need to be considered, as it is possible
to increase the key rate at the cost of a higher error rate. An upper bound on
an acceptable error rate is likely to be provided by the particular classical error
correction codes used subsequently. Many of these however will reduce the key
rate at high levels of noise, so a balance needs to be found. The question of
whether there exists a slicing method for a particular protocol which does not
alter the security of the system is also raised.
In addition to this, slicing is only one of a number of proposed reconciliation
methods. Others, not examined here, may also be vulnerable to side channel
attacks, exploiting either a reduction in security across the quantum classical
boundary, or unexpected information leakage in the joining of two or more clas-
sical protocols.
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Figure 8: (colour online) a) The secrecy of different slicing methods as a function
of channel capacity when using reverse reconciliation, and b) the optimal slicing
methods at each value of channel transmission. As with the direct reconciliation
case, A represents a Gray code with bins of equal probability, B is standard
binary with bins of equal probability, and C is a F-LFSR also with bins of equal
probability. Again, the best slicing method to use changes with the channel
transmission.
Figure 9: An example of a quantum network, where information is sent from
the base station to each terminal. The terminals are not necessarily equidistant
from the base station, suggesting that each path will have a different channel
capacity. This will cause issues in the choice of slicing method when attempting
to maximise the secrecy of the network.
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